This article is part of our collaboration with International Policy Review at IE University. Photo Credits: UNOWAS
Abstract
This article examines the relationship between climate change and violent extremism in Central Africa. It argues that environmental degradation exacerbates socio-economic inequalities, undermines state legitimacy, and creates conditions conducive to radicalization. Through comparative case studies of the Central African Republic (CAR), the Lake Chad Basin, and the Sahel, and an integrated analysis of environmental security, radicalization theory, and political ecology, this paper proposes a “green security” framework. This approach calls for policy interventions that combine climate adaptation, inclusive governance, and digital diplomacy. Special attention is given to Sustainable Development Goal 13 (Climate Action), whose objectives are directly relevant to the security and resilience challenges faced in the region. Ultimately, the study seeks to contribute to an evolving conversation on how security policy must adapt to the realities of climate change.
Keywords: Climate Change, Violent Extremism, Central Africa, Environmental Security, Political Ecology, Radicalization.
1. Introduction
Over the past several decades, climate change has shifted from a peripheral environmental concern to a central issue in global policy debates. While the immediate impacts of rising temperatures and altered weather patterns have been the subject of intense scientific scrutiny, a growing body of research now points to the broader socio-political consequences of climate change. In regions marked by socio-economic vulnerabilities and weak institutional frameworks, climate change acts as a potent catalyst that destabilizes communities and contributes to the emergence of violent extremism. Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in Central Africa — particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Chad — where the interplay of environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and persistent governance challenges creates an ecosystem in which extremist ideologies can flourish.
Central Africa is unique in that it simultaneously possesses vast natural resources — including diamonds, gold, timber, and oil — and suffers from systemic political and economic fragility. The region’s rich biodiversity and mineral wealth have historically been both a blessing and a curse: while they have the potential to drive economic development, mismanagement, corruption, and external exploitation have often left local communities impoverished and disenfranchised.
Against this backdrop, the impacts of climate change — dwindling water supplies, soil erosion, deforestation, and erratic precipitation — exacerbate pre-existing socio-economic disparities and undermine the legitimacy of state institutions. Based on available data, deforestation in Central Africa has been increasing over the past two decades. For instance, in the Central African Republic, the annual deforestation rate between 2010 and 2020 was approximately 30,000 hectares per-year. This rate reflects ongoing pressures on forest resources in the region and further destabilizes rural economies. As governments struggle to adapt to these mounting challenges, extremist groups step in to offer alternative forms of governance, social services, and economic relief.
This paper is driven by the central research question: To what extent does climate change exacerbate conditions for radicalization and violent extremism in regions experiencing environmental degradation, particularly within Central Africa? Answering this question addresses a critical policy gap. Although international agreements like the Paris Agreement and United Nations Security Council resolutions acknowledge the security dimensions of climate change, efforts to translate this recognition into concrete actions that integrate climate adaptation with counter-extremism strategies remain fragmented.
It is therefore imperative to examine not only the environmental triggers but also the complex interplay of economic, political, and digital factors that render communities vulnerable to radicalization. By synthesizing theoretical frameworks from environmental security, political ecology, and radicalization studies, and by incorporating documentary insights and comparative case studies, this paper seeks to illuminate the causal pathways through which climate change contributes to violent extremism.
Additionally, following the publication guidelines, this study is inspired by UN Sustainable Development Goal 13 (Climate Action). SDG 13 emphasizes urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts. In regions like Central Africa, where governance is weak and social resilience is low, the consequences of unmitigated climate change are felt most acutely on the individual, national, and global levels, fostering instability that extends beyond national borders. The empirical case studies — particularly CAR and the Lake Chad Basin — highlight how environmental degradation, if left unaddressed, impacts not only food security and livelihoods but also escalates into broader security challenges affecting regional and international peace.
Ultimately, this paper argues for an innovative “green security” framework that reconceptualizes security policy in an era of climate crisis, ensuring that interventions address both environmental sustainability and the socio-political drivers of radicalization.
1.1 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
The analysis presented in this paper is built upon an interdisciplinary foundation that draws on three interrelated bodies of literature: environmental security theory, radicalization studies, and political ecology. These perspectives, when integrated, provide a comprehensive understanding of how climate change can function as a threat multiplier in regions marked by socio-political instability.
Environmental security theory posits that climate change is not simply an ecological issue but a catalyst for broader security challenges. In fragile states, environmental degradation—whether it is caused by prolonged droughts, desertification, or declining water resources—exacerbates economic hardship and social fragmentation. Scholars have argued that climate change intensifies vulnerabilities in regions where governing capacity is already compromised. The resulting deterioration in living conditions, coupled with the loss of traditional livelihoods, creates a vacuum that can be exploited by non-state actors, including extremist groups. This notion of climate change as a “threat multiplier” has become a central tenet in discussions of modern security challenges.
Radicalization theory further deepens our understanding of this process by examining how disenfranchised populations become susceptible to extremist ideologies. When communities experience a systematic failure of the state to provide for basic needs, such as food security, water, and economic opportunity, they may turn to alternative sources of support. Extremist groups are often quick to capitalize on these vulnerabilities by offering not only material benefits but also a narrative of resistance and empowerment. Reports by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on the Climate-Security Nexus and Prevention of Violent Extremism highlight that in many parts of the world, the confluence of environmental stress and state neglect significantly increases the likelihood of extremist recruitment. The allure of extremist groups is not merely ideological; it is also rooted in the promise of economic stability and social support where the state has failed.
Political ecology offers an additional layer of analysis by framing environmental issues within broader socio-political and economic contexts. This perspective emphasizes that environmental degradation is often intricately linked to the distribution of power and resources. In Central Africa, for instance, the depletion of natural resources is both a symptom and a cause of political marginalization. Competing interests over scarce resources, such as water and arable land, can intensify intercommunal conflicts and exacerbate existing inequalities. Political ecology scholars argue that the struggle for natural resources is a fundamental driver of social and political dynamics, and that any comprehensive analysis of climate change must take into account these power relations. This theoretical lens underscores the importance of integrating environmental and security policies, as the mismanagement of natural resources is inextricably tied to governance and social justice.
The convergence of environmental security, radicalization theory, and political ecology provides a robust analytical framework for understanding the complex dynamics of the climate-extremism nexus. It is through this integrated lens that this paper examines how climate change acts as an indirect but potent driver of violent extremism in Central Africa. This comprehensive approach is essential for developing policy responses that are both context-specific and globally relevant.
1.1.1 Methodology
The overarching aim of this study is to delineate the causal mechanisms by which climate change exacerbates violent extremism in vulnerable regions, with a focus on Central Africa. To achieve this aim, the study pursues several specific objectives. First, it seeks to analyze the multifaceted impacts of environmental degradation—particularly resource scarcity, declining agricultural productivity, and economic instability—on local communities. Second, it critically evaluates the effectiveness of current policy responses at both international and national levels, identifying gaps and limitations in addressing the intertwined challenges of climate change and extremism. Third, the study proposes an integrated policy framework that combines robust climate adaptation measures with targeted counter-extremism strategies.
To guide this investigation, the following interrelated hypotheses are proposed. The Cascading Impact Hypothesis posits that climate-induced environmental degradation leads to economic collapse and mass displacement, which, in turn, create conditions that facilitate extremist recruitment. The Resource Scarcity Hypothesis asserts that intensified competition over diminishing natural resources deepens socio-economic divides and fuels intercommunal tensions, thereby providing fertile ground for extremist narratives. The Governance Failure Hypothesis suggests that weak or ineffective state responses to environmental crises erode public trust and drive vulnerable populations toward extremist groups that promise alternative governance models. The Digital Discourse Hypothesis highlights the role of social media and digital platforms in amplifying extremist propaganda, linking environmental injustice with state failure in the public imagination. Finally, the Adaptive Capacity Hypothesis contends that regions that successfully integrate climate adaptation with inclusive governance and economic diversification are more resilient to extremist infiltration.
To address the complex interplay of environmental, economic, and political factors underpinning violent extremism in Central Africa, this study adopts an interdisciplinary mixed-methods approach. This methodological design is structured around three core components: qualitative case studies, policy analysis, and content analysis.
The qualitative case studies form the empirical backbone of the research. The primary case study is the Central African Republic (CAR), a nation that epitomizes the challenges of environmental degradation compounded by chronic political instability. Data for this case study are drawn from a diverse array of sources, including government reports, non-governmental organization (NGO) assessments, academic journal articles, and interviews with experts in environmental security and counter-terrorism. Field observations, many of which have been documented in recent humanitarian reports and documentaries, provide rich, context-specific insights into how environmental stressors catalyze radicalization among local communities.
To contextualize and compare the findings from CAR, the study also incorporates case studies from the Lake Chad Basin and the broader Sahel region. Although these regions differ in their historical and socio-political contexts, they share common environmental challenges such as prolonged droughts, water scarcity, and resource mismanagement. Comparative analysis of these cases allows for the identification of universal patterns as well as region-specific nuances in the climate-extremism nexus.
The policy analysis component critically examines the effectiveness of existing international and national policy frameworks. At the international level, the study reviews global commitments such as the Paris Agreement, United Nations Security Council resolutions, and strategies formulated by multilateral institutions like the World Bank. The analysis focuses on the extent to which these frameworks integrate climate adaptation with counter-extremism measures, and it identifies the funding, coordination, and implementation gaps that undermine their effectiveness. At the national level, policy responses in CAR and other Central African states are examined, with particular attention to how issues of corruption, weak institutional capacity, and political fragmentation hinder climate adaptation initiatives.
The content analysis systematically reviews media reports, academic literature, and digital propaganda to understand how narratives linking climate change and violent extremism are constructed and disseminated. By comparing the framing of environmental issues in international news outlets, local media, and social media platforms, the analysis reveals discrepancies in public discourse. Extremist groups often exploit these discrepancies by linking environmental injustice to state failure, thereby reinforcing their recruitment messages. Multimedia sources further enrich this analysis, providing a counter-narrative that highlights both the human cost of environmental degradation and the success stories of community-led adaptation efforts.
By triangulating these diverse methods, the study ensures a comprehensive, nuanced, and empirically grounded understanding of the climate-extremism nexus. This integrated approach is essential for generating robust findings that can inform innovative, interdisciplinary policy recommendations.
2. Empirical Analysis and Comparative Case Studies
2.1 The Central African Republic: Environmental Degradation and Political Marginalization
The Central African Republic (CAR) stands as a stark illustration of how environmental degradation exacerbates socio-political instability. Despite abundant natural resources — including diamonds, gold, uranium, and timber — CAR remains one of the poorest and most fragile states globally. In 2022, CAR ranked 191 out of 193 countries on the Human Development Index, with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of only $493 USD. Over two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line, and the country has been trapped in cycles of violent conflict since the outbreak of civil war in 2013.
Widespread deforestation, land degradation, and the depletion of freshwater sources have severely undermined agricultural productivity, which constitutes approximately 31.7%-50% of GDP and sustains around 75% of the population. Between 2001 and 2020, CAR lost an estimated 843,000 hectares of its tree cover, with deforestation rates accelerating since 2015 due to conflict-driven displacement and logging.
Political instability compounds these environmental challenges. The collapse of central authority following the 2013 Séléka rebellion fragmented the country into zones controlled by competing armed groups. As of 2021, at least 70% of the national territory remained outside government control. This absence of state presence has profoundly impacted rural communities, limiting access to education, healthcare, water, and food.
Fieldwork reported by Médecins Sans Frontières highlights how displaced villagers often cite environmental collapse — failing crops, drying rivers — as a direct trigger for their flight, alongside violence. Documentaries such as Central African Republic: The Forgotten Crisis and reports by the UN Panel of Experts on CAR capture firsthand accounts of communities forced to negotiate access to natural resources, such as water wells and farmland, through local militias and warlords rather than through state institutions.
Extremist and armed groups have exploited this vacuum. Ex-Séléka factions, anti-Balaka militias, and transnational groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army have provided rudimentary governance, including food distribution, protection rackets, and basic legal arbitration. For instance, in Ouaka and Basse-Kotto prefectures, armed groups established informal marketplaces and charged taxes on trade and water access, filling the governance void left by the collapsing state.
Thus, in CAR, environmental degradation does not cause violent extremism directly. Rather, it operates in tandem with economic collapse, political disintegration, and governance failure to create conditions that extremist groups are quick to exploit. The case of CAR demonstrates the importance of addressing environmental vulnerability alongside political stabilization efforts to disrupt this cycle.
2.2 The Lake Chad Basin: Lessons from a Parallel Environmental Crisis
Although geographically distinct from Central Africa, the Lake Chad Basin offers critical insights into the broader dynamics of climate-induced extremism. Spanning parts of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, the Lake Chad region has experienced dramatic environmental transformations over the past few decades. Once one of Africa’s largest freshwater lakes, Lake Chad’s surface area has shrunk by over 90% due to prolonged droughts, mismanagement of water resources, and population pressures since the 1960s. The rapid contraction of the lake’s surface area has had profound socio-economic repercussions: this environmental catastrophe has devastated fishing and farming livelihoods, leaving millions unemployed or displaced. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization, over 10 million people in the Lake Chad region now require humanitarian assistance.
Extremist groups, notably Boko Haram, have adeptly exploited the resulting vulnerabilities. Boko Haram capitalized on these vulnerabilities by recruiting marginalized youths with promises of income, food, and a sense of belonging. Their propaganda often highlights the Nigerian government’s failure to address environmental decline, framing the insurgency as a form of resistance against systemic neglect. Eyewitness accounts and media reporting, such as Al Jazeera’s coverage “Lake Chad: ‘Rate of its shrinking is getting faster”, highlight the human cost of the lake’s rapid contraction. Interviews with displaced farmers and fishermen reveal narratives of government abandonment and socio-economic despair, which extremist groups skillfully amplify through social media channels.
The dynamics observed in the Lake Chad Basin bear striking similarities to those in CAR. Both regions experience severe environmental stress that leads to economic collapse, which in turn creates a vacuum of governance. However, while Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region frequently invokes religious rhetoric to mobilize support, extremist groups in CAR tend to focus on ethnic and political grievances compounded by environmental decline. This comparative analysis underscores the universality of the climate-extremism nexus while also highlighting the need for context-specific policy interventions that address both common drivers and local nuances.
2.3 The Sahel: Environmental Degradation and Intercommunal Conflict
Stretching across West and North Africa, the Sahel region — encompassing Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and others — offers another critical perspective on the climate-extremism nexus.
Desertification has rendered vast tracts of land unusable for agriculture or grazing. Between 1960 and 2020, the Sahel lost approximately 650,000 km² of productive agricultural land. Competition over dwindling resources has intensified intercommunal conflicts, particularly between herders and farmers.
Extremist groups such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) have exploited these conflicts, framing them within broader narratives of injustice and systemic exclusion. Recruitment strategies often promise protection or revenge for communities marginalized by state inaction.
Analysis of social media content shows that extremist propaganda frequently uses imagery of barren landscapes and displaced farmers to evoke anger and resentment.
Although the Sahel shares commonalities with CAR and Lake Chad, it also presents unique dimensions: religious framing of grievances is more pronounced, and violent extremist groups often operate across national borders, complicating state responses.
2. Policy Analysis and Integrated Strategies
2.1 International Frameworks and Their Limitations
The international community has increasingly acknowledged the security dimensions of climate change, but major frameworks remain limited in their effectiveness. The Paris Agreement (2015) recognizes the importance of adaptation and resilience, but primarily focuses on emissions targets rather than the intersection between climate degradation and security vulnerabilities.
United Nations Security Council resolutions have gradually integrated references to climate security, notably Resolution 2349 (2017) on the Lake Chad Basin, which identifies climate change as a factor exacerbating conflict and displacement. However, most resolutions stop short of mandating concrete action plans linking climate adaptation to counter-extremism efforts.
A report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research highlights persistent obstacles: bureaucratic fragmentation, inadequate funding, and conflicting national priorities. Despite rhetorical commitments, practical coordination across environmental, humanitarian, and security sectors remains limited.
Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank have launched resilience-building projects — for example, the Lake Chad Basin Stabilization Strategy — but these initiatives often lack mechanisms to address political grievances or to integrate counter-radicalization efforts explicitly.
Thus, while climate security has entered the international agenda, its operationalization remains fragmented and insufficient, allowing extremist groups to exploit governance gaps.
2.2 National Policy Failures and Opportunities for Integration
In Central Africa, national governments have launched a variety of climate adaptation initiatives. For example, the Central African Republic has attempted reforestation and soil conservation programs in cooperation with UN agencies. Yet endemic corruption, low institutional capacity, and ongoing conflict severely limit the reach and sustainability of these efforts.
Government-led projects like CAR’s “Programme de Réhabilitation de l’Agriculture et de la Sécurité Alimentaire” (PRASA) have shown some success in pilot areas but lack scale and consistency. Transparency International ranks CAR among the most corrupt countries globally, further undermining public trust and donor confidence.
By contrast, Niger’s “3N Initiative” (Nigeriens Nourish Nigeriens) offers a model of integrated resilience-building. This program combines food security, sustainable resource management, and local governance reforms to simultaneously address environmental and socio-political vulnerabilities. Evaluations by the OECD suggest that where community participation was robust, resilience against both ecological shocks and extremist infiltration improved measurably.
The comparative success of Niger highlights the critical need for cross-sectoral coordination — linking climate adaptation, governance reforms, and counter-extremism strategies — rather than treating them in isolation.
A critical barrier to achieving this integration, however, is the persistent separation between environmental agencies and security institutions. Historically, counter-terrorism efforts have been the domain of military and intelligence agencies, while climate adaptation has been relegated to environmental ministries. This compartmentalization prevents the development of a unified strategy that acknowledges the complex interdependencies between ecological decline and political instability. To overcome this barrier, policy-makers must foster inter-ministerial collaboration and develop new governance structures that facilitate the integration of environmental sustainability with security measures. For instance, the establishment of joint task forces that include representatives from environmental, defense, and development agencies could provide a platform for coordinated policy formulation and resource allocation. Furthermore, capacity-building initiatives aimed at strengthening local institutions and empowering community leaders are essential for ensuring that state interventions are both effective and inclusive.
2.3 Digital Diplomacy and the Role of Media in Countering Extremist Narratives
Extremist groups in Central Africa and the Sahel have demonstrated a sophisticated use of digital platforms to propagate narratives linking state failure to environmental injustice. Analysis by the Institute for Security Studies shows that social media propaganda often deploys images of barren landscapes and suffering communities to amplify recruitment appeals.
Digital diplomacy offers a counter-strategy. Governments, civil society organizations, and international agencies can leverage digital platforms to highlight successful adaptation projects, showcase community resilience, and disseminate positive narratives that rebuild trust in institutions.
For instance, the UN Development Programme’s “Climate Promise” campaign uses digital storytelling — including videos, blogs, and interactive maps — to share stories of local climate resilience projects from vulnerable regions like Niger and the Sahel.
However, successful digital diplomacy must be culturally tailored. Studies by the Brookings Institution emphasize that messaging must resonate with local identities, grievances, and aspirations to counter extremist narratives effectively.
Finally, early warning systems that combine environmental monitoring with social media analysis offer promise for identifying emerging hotspots of vulnerability before extremist groups can exploit them.
3. Discussion: Toward a Paradigm of Integrated Green Security
The empirical evidence and policy analyses presented above converge on a clear insight: addressing violent extremism in regions such as Central Africa requires a fundamental rethinking of conventional security paradigms. Traditional approaches — centered primarily on military intervention and intelligence operations — are insufficient to tackle the multifaceted challenges posed by climate change. Instead, a new paradigm of “green security” is emerging, one that views environmental sustainability, socio-economic resilience, and inclusive governance as integral components of national and international security.
Green security calls for a shift from reactive, compartmentalized measures toward proactive, integrated strategies that address both the technical and human dimensions of climate-induced extremism. At its core, green security emphasizes the need for building resilient communities that are capable of withstanding environmental shocks while maintaining social cohesion and trust in state institutions. This approach requires a reorientation of state priorities, moving away from an exclusive reliance on hard power toward a balanced strategy that includes sustainable development, participatory governance, and digital innovation.
Central to the green security framework is the recognition that environmental degradation and violent extremism are not isolated phenomena. They are inextricably linked through a complex web of economic, political, and social factors. By addressing the root causes of environmental decline — such as unsustainable agricultural practices, deforestation, and poor water management — policy-makers can disrupt the vicious cycle that fuels economic collapse and radicalization. Furthermore, by fostering inclusive governance and empowering local communities through participatory decision-making processes, governments can rebuild public trust and reduce the allure of extremist alternatives.
The transformation toward a green security paradigm also requires innovative approaches to policy formulation and implementation. As highlighted in recent academic debates, the integration of environmental and security agendas necessitates greater inter-ministerial collaboration, capacity-building at the local level, and the development of new governance structures that can accommodate the multidimensional nature of contemporary security challenges. Digital technologies offer a promising avenue for achieving these goals by facilitating real-time communication, early warning, and targeted intervention strategies. However, it is important to acknowledge that the feasibility of deploying advanced digital solutions in fragile states like the Central African Republic is limited. Chronic underfunding, weak technological infrastructure, ongoing conflict, and widespread corruption all pose serious barriers to the effective implementation of such tools. Without significant external support and institution-building efforts, the transformative potential of digital technologies in these contexts may remain aspirational rather than immediately attainable.
Moreover, an out-of-the-box perspective on security must acknowledge the potential of cross-sectoral partnerships. Collaborations between governments, international organizations, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and local communities can foster a holistic approach to addressing climate-induced extremism. Such partnerships enable the pooling of resources, expertise, and local knowledge, thereby enhancing the overall effectiveness of integrated policy responses. Yet here too, political fragmentation and limited trust between stakeholders often hamper coordination efforts in conflict-affected settings.
The implications of adopting a green security framework extend beyond Central Africa. Globally, as nations grapple with the intersecting challenges of climate change, political instability, and digital disruption, the traditional paradigms of security are increasingly being called into question. The experiences of regions like CAR, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Sahel offer valuable lessons for the international community. They illustrate that a one-size-fits-all approach is inadequate and that tailored, context-specific interventions are necessary to mitigate the complex drivers of violent extremism.
In conclusion, the future of international security will depend on our collective ability to reconceptualize security in a way that transcends traditional military and intelligence paradigms. Embracing integrated approaches that combine environmental sustainability, socio-economic development, and digital diplomacy is not only desirable but imperative. The green security framework provides a blueprint for such a transformation — one that is grounded in empirical evidence, enriched by diverse academic perspectives, and responsive to the lived realities of vulnerable communities.
4. Conclusion
The relationship between climate change and violent extremism in Central Africa represents one of the most urgent security challenges of our time. This paper has demonstrated that environmental degradation, through mechanisms such as resource scarcity, economic collapse, and the erosion of state legitimacy, creates conditions that extremist groups are quick to exploit. Empirical evidence from the Central African Republic, coupled with comparative analyses of the Lake Chad Basin and the broader Sahel, reveals a consistent pattern: when local communities are subjected to the ravages of climate change and witness state failure, the appeal of radical alternatives intensifies.
Despite growing international awareness of the climate-extremism nexus, as evidenced by landmark agreements like the Paris Agreement and emerging discussions in United Nations forums, the current policy landscape remains fragmented and insufficient. Existing frameworks tend to compartmentalize environmental and security issues, leaving a critical gap that extremist groups readily fill. Moreover, even where climate adaptation initiatives exist, weak governance structures, corruption, and limited technological capacity frequently undermine their effectiveness, especially in fragile contexts like CAR.
This paper argues that only by embracing a holistic “green security” paradigm (one that integrates climate adaptation, inclusive governance, and digital innovation) can policymakers hope to effectively counter the drivers of violent extremism. While digital tools offer promising opportunities for early warning and community engagement, their deployment must be realistic about the infrastructural, financial, and political limitations in conflict-affected regions.
To this end, several policy recommendations emerge. Investments in sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, and modern water management are essential for mitigating the immediate impacts of environmental degradation. These technical measures must be complemented by efforts to strengthen state institutions through increased transparency, community engagement, and inter-ministerial collaboration. Equally important is the need to harness digital technologies — tailored to local capacities — to counter extremist propaganda and promote positive narratives of resilience and hope. Where feasible, cross-sectoral partnerships involving governments, NGOs, and local communities should be prioritized to maximize impact.
Together, these integrated strategies offer the most promising pathway toward long-term stability and security in Central Africa and beyond. However, their success depends not only on technical design but also on sustained political will, financial commitment, and cultural sensitivity.
In a rapidly changing world where climate change is increasingly intertwined with political and social dynamics, rethinking security is not merely an academic exercise — it is a moral imperative. The challenge of climate-induced extremism compels us to move beyond traditional approaches and embrace innovative, cross-sectoral strategies that prioritize human security and environmental sustainability. Only by addressing the root causes of both environmental degradation and political marginalization can the international community hope to stem the tide of violent extremism and build a more resilient, just, and peaceful future.
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