Closing the Funding Gap: Assessing the Role of Multilateral Development Banks in Advancing SDG 17

This article is part of our collaboration with International Policy Review at IE University. Photo Credits: The Exchange.

Abstract

The global Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) annual finance gap is currently estimated at $4 trillion, creating a major impasse for low- and middle-income countries. Within this context, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) have emerged as key actors in addressing the gap by facilitating access to financing and fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships. Focusing on two strategic instruments—blended finance and thematic bonds—this article examines how MDBs leverage resources, de-risk private investment, and catalyse cooperation among governments, private actors, and civil society in support of SDG 17. It argues that while MDBs are uniquely positioned to advance SDG 17’s targets through their technical expertise and ability to mobilise alternative funding, existing structural challenges constrain their potential. To support a more effective deployment of blended finance and thematic bonds, the article offers policy recommendations focused on technical support and governance reform to strengthen MDB-led efforts.

1. Introduction

“By investing in the Sustainable Development Goals, we invest in the future” – Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary General.

As the UN 2030 Agenda approaches its final years, the world faces a cruel reality: the grand promises of sustainable development remain largely unfulfilled, with insufficient funding in key areas. Despite global efforts since its adoption in 2015, a staggering financial gap—now estimated at $4 trillion annually in developing countries—continues to stall progress across the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Closing the gap has become even more critical as interconnected global challenges—ranging from climate change to armed conflicts and social inequality—continue to escalate, demanding urgent and coordinated action. Under these circumstances, achieving the seventeen goals by the target year of 2030 will require the mobilisation of an additional $30 trillion from various sources, evidencing that no single entity can or will be able to take on this task alone.

This scenario leaves no doubt to the increasing urgency in advancing SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals), as it stands as the backbone of the agenda providing a framework to unlock progress across all other sixteen goals through strengthened partnerships and the mobilisation of resources. It emphasizes the importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships, bringing together governments, the private sector, international institutions, civil society and NGOs to ensure financial resources, technology, data, and knowledge are shared to address the most pressing needs of our time. Yet, it has been daunting to achieve these goals amidst rising geopolitical tensions and a failing global financial system—one that is misaligned with equity principles and unfit to effectively address the needs of the Global South.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are strategically positioned at the intersection of finance and development to address these shortcomings, becoming key drivers of SDG 17’s advancement. They not only mobilise additional resources but also enhance credibility, build institutional capacity, and provide technical expertise in development projects. Through a diverse toolkit of instruments and strategies, MDBs are able to ensure their investments are both innovative and SDG-aligned.

Nonetheless, as MDBs grew in influence and impact, questions over whether they democratise access to finance in developing countries—or instead reinforce power asymmetries—have become central to the debate about their governance model. This debate is rooted in theoretical fields such as Neoinstitutionalism and Dependency Theory, that study how institutional and power structures can shape behavior, influence decision-making, and consequently determine development priorities. Thus, it becomes important to assess both the technical effectiveness of MDB operations and their contribution to the principles of equity and inclusivity, which are at the core of the SDGs.

To further explore their evolving role in sustainable development, this article examines how MDBs operate as facilitators of partnerships and financial mobilisation through two mechanisms: blended finance and thematic bonds. It also explores whether MDBs are effectively leveraging these tools to advance SDG 17, particularly in the Global South. Accordingly, the analysis aims to answer two questions: (i) to what extent are MDBs leveraging blended finance and thematic bonds in line with SDG 17 targets; and (ii) whether these financing mechanisms are promoting equitable access for the Global South, or perpetuating structural and power asymmetries. In doing so, the article offers insights into the role of MDBs in advancing SDG 17 and, ultimately in shaping a more inclusive global financing system that is aligned with sustainable development and its goals.

2. SDG 17: Where do We Stand?

The 2024 SDG Progress Report revealed that under SDG 17, only 30% of the targets are on track, while around 25% show moderate progress, 20% marginal advancement, and an alarming 25% exhibiting either stagnation or regression. Furthermore, the current $4 trillion investment gap in developing countries, which represents a 60% increase from 2019, leaves the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with little to no support to tackle the vicious cycle of underdevelopment and poverty. For the first time in this century, per capita growth in GDP is slower in half the world’s most vulnerable countries compared to advanced economies, suggesting inequality is widening.

To better understand the sources of this underperformance of SDG 17, in the following subsection we turn the focus to explore the enduring barriers to and/or improvements of the goal’s specific targets. By exploring these in more detail, it is possible to acquire an understanding of where specifically the system has been failing, and where interventions are most needed.

1.1 Target-specific Insights

The current status for domestic resource mobilisation (Target 17.1) is overall stagnation. The dynamism seen in tax revenue in the first decade of the millennium was not sustained, with an increase in the disparity in tax-to-GDP ratio between developed countries and LDCs. While in developed economies the tax revenue amounted to over 22% of GDP before the pandemic, in LDCs it only amounted to 12%.

In terms of Official Development Assistance (ODA) (Target 17.2), there has been marginal progress, while significant acceleration is needed. International development cooperation has seen an important growth in 2022, when members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provided $211 billion in ODA—more than double the amount from two decades ago. However, this impressive jump was due to investments related to the Covid-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine, otherwise ODA would have declined 1.2% in real terms compared to 2019. Thus, most donor countries still fall short in their commitment to contribute at least 0.7% of their GNI to development aid.

Additional financial resources for development (Target 17.3) has seen moderate progress, but advancements are still required. Total official support for sustainable development raised $342.1 billion in 2022 as reported by 101 sources. This included $276.6 billion in official resources, $55.3 billion from private finance and $10.2 billion from private grants for development. Furthermore, grants for sustainable development slightly decreased, while concessional development loans increased by 6%.

On the other hand, there has been a worrying regression in debt sustainability (Target 17.4). In 2022, the external debt of low and middle-income countries fell to $9 trillion but remained at historically high levels. With rising interest rates, about 60% of low-income countries are at high risk of debt distress.

When it comes to investment promotion for LDCs (Target 17.5), advancements have not shown to be promising. Aid to LDCs grew just 9% in real terms, while these populations face severe structural impediments to sustainable development. Moreover, 2022 data indicate a 0.7% decrease in bilateral funding for LDCs compared to 2021.

Finally, when examining partnerships (Targets 17.16 and 17.17), the 2024 SDG Report indicates there is insufficient evidence to quantify its impact worldwide. Still, the United Nations and other stakeholders have put forward various resources and initiatives aimed at enhancing global cooperation for the goals. Two examples include the SDG Actions Platform, a collection of over 8,100 commitments to multi-stakeholder partnerships; and the SDG Partnership Guidebook, a practical guide to building high-impact multi-stakeholder partnerships. These resources are critical to fostering collaboration across sectors.

In conclusion, the individual target-based data show the degree to which each area under SDG 17 has either progressed or stalled. Still, an overall pattern emerges: temporary gains moved by global-scale crisis and regressions as a result of systemic risks. These vulnerabilities indicate deeper structural issues within the international financial architecture, one that continues to preserve the historical dynamics of the Bretton Woods system, reinforcing financial hierarchies and marginalising the development needs of the Global South.

3. MDBs: Unlocking the Potential of Alternative Finance and Partnerships

MDBs hold promise in unlocking the potential of alternative finance and partnerships in spite of the outlook of underperformance outlined in section 2. MDBs are cooperative financial institutions owned and governed by a group of countries. Their mission is to finance long-term development projects, fostering sustainable growth, reducing poverty and strengthening resilience in the developing world. There are around thirty MDBs worldwide that operate in a capacity no other type of entity can fully provide. As Chris Humphrey observes, the uniqueness of the MDB model is that no other kind of institution combines “a public policy mandate, a multilateral cooperative framework, global expertise, and the financial firepower to make investments at scale.” This institutional hybrid model is precisely how MDBs translate ambitious global development goals into actionable financing strategies.

The MDB model has proven to be successful in mobilising alternative investments for public goods, while member states have minimal fiscal costs and risks are mitigated for private investors. In 2022 alone, MDBs annual disbursements reached $96 billion, a figure that could rise to $500 billion according to the SDGs Stimulus plan—reflecting both the potential of their operations and the central role MDBs play in helping close the financing gap. More importantly, their mechanisms are not just simply financial—they are inherently partnerships-based, amplifying MDBs ability to promote progress for SDG 17.

The following subsections focus on two mechanisms—blended finance and thematic bonds—as they are well-suited to directly address SDG 17, though they are by no means the only instruments in the MDB toolkit.

3.1 Blended Finance

Blended finance is the use of concessional or public funds to mobilise additional private resources towards development projects in emerging countries. It helps bridge the finance gap in vulnerable economies by absorbing part of the financial risks through instruments such as guarantees or subordinated debt, which crowd in investors that would otherwise be risk-averse vis-à-vis these countries.

In this scenario, MDBs play a role as intermediaries of cross-sectoral collaboration, aligning and balancing the development and commercial goals of private investors, donor governments, philanthropic actors and recipient countries, in alignment with targets 17.16 and 17.17. Although blended finance is not exclusively deployed by MDBs, they can access public and private capital with the credibility and expertise needed to mitigate risk and build investor trust effectively.

To illustrate their practical application, let’s turn to real-world examples. Within the World Bank Group there are two distinct, yet complementary, platforms that further scale the use of concessional finance in collaboration with the private sector—the International Finance Corporation (IFC) blended finance platform and the International Development Association (IDA) Private Sector Window’s Blended Finance Facility (BFF). These platforms align private investment with public objectives, improving the Group’s ability to deliver results on SDG 17. On the one hand, the IFC’s blended finance strategy combines concessional finance to engage private investments in high-impact sectors. On the other hand, the IDA BFF is a key platform that enhances IFC and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) investment in private sector projects in IDA-eligible countries. Together these two platforms provide a breadth of action to the World Bank—considering the former is well-suited to attract private investment to emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs), while the latter is indispensable for pioneering investments in LDCs. All in all, they expand financing in the Global South— contributing directly to targets 17.3 and 17.5.

The Finland-IFC Blended Finance for Climate Program (BFCP) is another excellent example of blended finance enabling high-impact, multi-stakeholder partnerships through an MDB. With active investments from 2017 to 2023, the BFCP is a €114 million partnership between Finland and the IFC, supporting 16 innovative investments to unlock private capital for climate-smart projects in developing countries. In Vietnam, the partnership contributed with a $15 million senior loan to the Bac Ninh Waste-To-Energy (WTE) plant, allowing the construction of waste treatment facilities that significantly boost the province’s current waste treatment capacity. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the BFCP channelled a $5 million equity investment to fund Congo Energy Solutions Limited (Nuru)’s operations in building and operating three solar hybrid mini-grid projects expected to provide more affordable and reliable electricity to 28,000 households and businesses in the region. In West and Central Africa, a €10 million equity investment helped the Afrigreen Debt Impact Fund reach significant scale, financing small and medium solar projects with local currency instruments to de-risk investments in Ghana and Nigeria.

The strategic component of blended finance initiatives such as the Finland-IFC program is that they are multi-stakeholder by design: there’s a sovereign donor (Finland) supplying concessional funds; national governments providing regulatory support; private sector delivering equity investment; national companies developing and managing infrastructure; and the IFC bringing technical expertise and positioning itself as an intermediary between all actors. Thus, the operationalization of blended finance via MDB-led platforms (e.g. IDA BFF) and programs (e.g. BFCP) exemplifies the effective use of the mechanism to improve project viability, strengthen partnerships that align public and private capital, and de-risk investments through concessional co-financing in the Global South. As a result, these projects create ecosystems that build replicable, scalable models that advance the 2030 Agenda.

3.2 Thematic Bonds

Thematic bonds are fixed-income securities issued to directly finance projects with social or environmental purposes. These instruments are called “thematic” because they are defined by the purpose of their proceeds. Over the past decade, thematic bonds have gained traction among MDBs as an important tool to align capital markets with the 2030 Agenda, particularly addressing specific financing gaps in developing countries. MDBs have the ability to shape the thematic bonds market, not only as issuers or advisors, but also as market-influencers that are able to mitigate risk and standardise frameworks. To de-risk an operation they deploy different strategies—these include their AAA credit ratings reputation, first loss guarantees, due diligence in project selection, currency hedging, amongst others that help make sure thematic bonds are safer for private investors. And it is through these efforts that they crowd in the private sector at scale, though not yet at the scale needed to meet global financing goals.

Their appeal lies both in their thematic orientation and in their potential to generate development additionality, a core approach in MDBs’ mandates. According to the United Nations Development Program, thematic bonds generate value beyond capital when they meet at least one of three conditions: cost, access, or learning and commitment. The cost dimension involves lower borrowing costs when investors accept reduced returns to support sustainable outcomes—known as the “greenium”. Access refers to the ability of thematic bonds to attract new, long-term, and more stable investors, expanding high-quality capital. Finally, learning and commitment reflects how thematic bonds can strengthen institutions by including impact frameworks, reporting standards, and accountability mechanisms into public management. These dimensions also clarify where MDBs can be most impactful, by enhancing credibility, expanding investor access, and institutionalising environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices in emerging markets.

Let’s now look at how thematic bonds play out in practice. The World Bank has led the thematic bonds movement since it first issued a green bond back in 2008. Its Sustainable Finance and ESG Advisory Services, for instance, forge partnerships with policymakers, ministries of finance, regulators, and central banks to build the capacity of emerging economies for issuing bonds. These multi-stakeholder partnerships, that are in line with targets 17.16 and 17.17, have provided assistance to innovative bond issuances across different legal, cultural, and market contexts—which illustrates the flexibility of the World Bank in aligning global finance with local development priorities and actors. Some examples include the pioneering Malaysian Sukuk, a Sharia-compliant bond; Seychelles’ sovereign blue bond; and Colombia’s first green bond in local currency—collectively mobilising a total of $7.7 billion from the private sector for development.

A particularly impactful example is Brazil’s successful debut of a $2 billion sovereign sustainable bond in November 2023. The Brazilian bond represents an integrated sustainability approach, with the proceeds allocated to deforestation control, biodiversity conservation, the National Climate Change Fund, poverty alleviation and hunger reduction. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank jointly provided technical assistance to the Brazilian National Treasury in this process, demonstrating the valuable role of collaboration in designing credible and impactful financing instruments. Moreover, the World Bank’s ongoing support in the preparation of a post-issuance impact report further illustrates the legitimacy-enhancing role MDBs can play in guaranteeing transparency and accountability of the financial tools it puts forward.

Brazil’s issuance showcases a replicable strategy—when respecting national contexts—through which MDBs can attract stable and long-term external capital aligned with sustainability outcomes (Target 17.3), leverage partnerships from capital markets, other MDBs and sovereign actors (Target 17.17), while strengthening institutional national governance. When shared agency and national accountability go hand in hand, MDBs can also play the role of innovators in national financial structures.

3.3 Comparative Analysis: the Complementary Elements of Blended Finance and Thematic Bonds

While blended finance and thematic bonds are technically distinct, they can be complementary in their role in advancing SDG 17. Both are able to address key targets— mobilising additional resources (17.3), fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships (17.16, 17.17), and to a certain extent capacity building (17.9). Their importance as key mechanisms in the MDB toolkit also lies in their ability to tailor and adapt to varied economic contexts and development finance needs.

Blended finance excels at mitigating financial risks in high-risk, underdeveloped markets, increasing private capital flows in unconventional settings for traditional investors. It is particularly suited for the early stages of development projects—as seen in BFCP’s case study. In contrast, thematic bonds focus on mobilising and scaling up investment for projects that have already been de-risked and proven to be viable, mainly functioning as a financial vehicle. In this way, blended finance can often play a role in laying the groundwork for thematic bonds to build upon. Hence, their complementarity comes from the interplay between blended finance setting the foundation in project structuring and risk management, and thematic bonds operating in channeling long-term finance to more bankable initiatives that are aligned with sustainability outcomes.

As this analysis has shown, MDBs have evolved beyond traditional development lenders into platforms for alternative finance and multi-stakeholder, resilient partnerships. Through their ability to leverage blended finance and thematic bonds they increase their capacity of meaningfully contributing to the closing of the SDG funding gap. Yet, the financial capital and cooperation scale needed for 2030 has not yet been reached, as the worrying data highlighted in section 2 of this paper show. In what follows, an examination of the challenges brought about by the tools discussed will inform policy recommendations aimed at improving the inclusiveness, accountability, and impact of MDB-led projects.

4. Blended Finance and Thematic Bonds: Evaluation and Recommendations

As the gaps identified in the previous sections persist, MDB-led tools must be reassessed in two fronts: their technical impact and their capacity to provide equitable access to finance in the Global South. It is paramount to critically evaluate the areas in which blended finance and thematic bonds need improvement, so as to offer actionable policy recommendations that can help these instruments better deliver on the targets of SDG 17. Equally important is guaranteeing that MDB governance is equitable, preventing power asymmetries that marginalise the Global South, reflecting recipient-country priorities, and rebalancing concessional allocation frameworks.

4.1 Blended Finance

Blended finance has demonstrated significant promise in development finance, but it has not yet reached the scale and impact needed to promote progress across the SDGs—annual totals have stagnated at approximately $15 billion over the past 15 years. Accordingly, mobilised private funds accounted for 38% of total resources and only 16% destined for climate. As a result, blended finance has not escaped criticism.

There are three flaws that are central to the debate surrounding blended finance: (I) inequitable allocation, (II) market distortion, and (III) misaligned stakeholder incentives. In the context of the G20’s infrastructure asset class agenda—which heavily relies on blended finance—Griffiths and Romero argue that current structures often prioritise investor preferences over public value, which channels resources toward lower-risk, middle-income countries with commercially attractive sectors. This reinforces the marginalisation of LDCs—where development needs are most urgent, with only $0.37 of private capital is mobilised for every $1 of public investment (inequitable allocation). Moreover, the use of concessional finance to attract private funding can unintentionally distort markets by artificially inflating the attractiveness of projects and crowding out private investors—resulting in an inefficient use of public funds (market distortion). Daniela Gabor conceptually links this to a broader trend where development is increasingly guided by global capital markets that prioritise profitability rather than development. Hence, the need to inflate project attractiveness for private investors. Blended finance consequently becomes prone to coordination failures, particularly when return expectations and risk appetites diverge between the public and private spheres (misaligned incentives).

Three technical mechanisms—portfolio approach to risk-sharing, strengthening local capacity, and conditionalities —are amendments that can improve the three discussed flaws of blended finance. Firstly, the portfolio approach, highly applied in investment strategies, is able to spread risk and attract institutional investors that require larger and more predictable investment opportunities through pooling a diversified portfolio of projects. Mariana Mazzucato contends that when diversifying sectors and geographies, this approach creates space for higher-risk, higher-impact projects to be included alongside safer, commercially viable ones—directly tackling inequitable allocation and misaligned incentives.

Secondly, strengthening local capacity is critical to solve inequitable allocation issues and reduce investor risk perceptions in LDCs. MDBs have the expertise to increase targeted technical assistance, project preparation support, and strengthen local institutional capacity to make sure these markets are more prepared to receive blended finance effectively.

Lastly, development-linked conditionalities are powerful in concessional arrangements, ensuring that public funds are strictly used when tied to measurable impact targets. This mechanism helps align incentives between public and private actors while preserving accountability to the SDGs.

From a structural perspective, these technical fixes must go hand in hand with a broader reform in MDB governance. The development finance architecture must not be constrained by the preferences and agendas of donor over recipient countries’ needs. Ultimately, a democratised access to blended finance and equitable concessional allocation will emerge as a result of a shift from investor-centric models to locally-led frameworks that not only listen, but include the Global South in decision making and voting shares.

4.2 Thematic Bonds

It is true that thematic bonds helped sustainability become an investable asset. Their demand has grown, and sovereign issuances are in an upward trend driven by successful cases like Brazil’s sovereign sustainable bond. And yet, as of 2022, sustainable debt only accounted for $863 billion—or 5% of the global bond market. Plus, out of the current 40 sovereign issuers, only six lower- and middle-income countries—of which only one is an LDC—have accessed the bond market. For many developing countries that find themselves at high risk of debt distress, the complexity and cost of issuance adds another layer of fragility—undermining the potential of the mechanism to truly deliver development impact where it is most needed.

Reports have pointed out three limitations in thematic bonds: (I) high transaction costs and complexity, (II) regulatory and institutional gaps, and (III) greenwashing risks. In many developing countries, the lack of strong institutions to design, implement, and properly monitor these bonds leads to low investor trust and risks of greenwashing schemes in the name of sustainability, without true accountability..

Based on the understanding that thematic bonds can act as both financial and governance strengthening instruments, MDBs must expand their role in three technical axes—framework standardisation, institutional capacity building, and post-issuance accountability. This article proposes two complementary approaches to framework standardisation. First, a top-down standardisation that follows the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) and The Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD) frameworks, as they will guarantee a streamlined process that simplifies execution and reduces costs in issuance. As these disclosure guidelines continue to evolve, it is paramount that MDBs position themselves as advocates for Global South concerns, calling for their direct involvement in the procedural drafting. Second, a locally-grounded approach, co-created between MDBs and regional stakeholders, to ensure frameworks are both TNFD-aligned and inclusive by design. Both approaches can appear conflicting, nonetheless their integration within a layered governance structure can enhance coordination and inclusivity—while top-down standardisation ensures norm coherence at a global level, bottom-up guarantees these norms are effectively embedded within local frameworks, addressing local needs. This dual approach helps reduce transaction costs through bridging institutional gaps, and mitigate greenwashing practices through inclusive, accountable compliance guidelines. Additionally, it builds an iterative standardisation process, where local experience informs evolving global standards, and global standards feed into local contexts.

Notwithstanding, standardisation efforts are enhanced when closely connected to effective institutional capacity building that empowers issuing countries with the capacity to operationalise thematic bonds. MDBs must therefore provide targeted technical assistance through a task force that includes: pre-issuance support in project identification and ESG alignment, training high-level government officials on sustainability reporting, and reinforcing public financial management to oversee compliance. Although MDBs already support issuers through ad hoc technical advice, there is no institutionalised mechanism that embeds long-term capacity building as a condition for that support. This is why this article proposes the creation of a “Joint Sovereign Issuance and Capacity Task Force”—a shared agency cooperation between MDBs and Ministries of Finance of issuer countries. This joint task force does not intend to impose conditionality on the traditional sense, which in the past has raised valid concerns on sovereignty infringement. Instead, it aims at reframing conditionality as a co-design that empowers the issuer to build institutional capabilities that will allow it to replicate bonds independently in the future. In doing so, conditionality is leveraged as mutual commitment to technical transfer and sovereign ownership.

Lastly, the capacity-building model must be linked to post-issuance accountability mechanisms—mandatory impact reports, independent third-party verification, and transparent ESG disclosures. These tools are able to guarantee the credibility of thematic bonds through transparency and performance monitoring, which safeguards the mechanism against greenwashing. When combined with capacity building efforts, issuers become effectively equipped to lead the monitoring and accountability processes on their own with credibility.

All in all, blended finance and thematic bonds must move beyond the technical function of mobilising and scaling capital into becoming instruments of governance strengthening. Whether they foster inclusive and equitable development finance or replicate structural inequalities will be ultimately determined by how MDBs choose to design, apply, and govern these mechanisms. In this sense, Multilateral Development Banks’ role in closing the financial gap and advancing SDG 17 is not simply technical, but also greatly structural. MDBs must emerge as agents of change in a system that has been failing the 2030 Agenda.

5. Conclusion

With only five years remaining to reach 2030, the sustainable development agenda not only requires urgent progress towards SDG 17, but also demands a shift in how development finance is structured and governed. Multilateral Development Banks are inherently well-suited with tools, partnerships, and alternative financing mechanisms—such as blended finance and thematic bonds—to drive the transformative change needed and effectively address SDG 17’s targets. Yet, their success will strongly depend on whether they are capable of mobilising and scaling capital in an inclusive and equitable manner through redistribution of influence, agency, and accountability. With development priorities in mind, blended finance and thematic bonds are qualified to access the Global South, and not only make sure these countries are not sidelined but also put in the center of development finance in every aspect.

Time is of the essence, but the way is clear: there is an opportunity for improving and boosting MDB technical and structural impact. Thus, MDBs are left with a dual task: to financially innovate—but also to reform.

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