Water Scarcity and Refugee Influx in Jordan: Policy Challenges and Sustainable Solutions for SDG 6

This article is part of our collaboration with International Policy Review at IE University. Photo Credits: UNHCR Jordan

Abstract

Jordan, one of the driest countries in the world, is suffering from a severe water crisis compounded by climate change, a surging population, and the ongoing refugee crisis, particularly from Syria. The piece will analyze Jordan’s precarious position in achieving SDG 6, water and sanitation for all. More specifically, the article will discuss the National Water Strategy, it will analyze the impact of the surrounding regional instability, and it will highlight the future transboundary agreements for water and energy trading. The article also prescribes policy, with a view to enhancing financial sustainability and constructing public trust. Finally, Jordan’s experience demonstrates that policies addressing water scarcity must be coordinated under such compromised conditions. 

Keywords: Water scarcity, SDG 6, Jordan, Refugees, Climate change, Desalination, Non-Revenue Water (NRW), Transboundary water governance, Israel-Jordan-UAE Water-Energy Deal, Sustainable development, Water infrastructure, Renewable energy, Middle East, Regional cooperation, Water policy.

1. Introduction 

As outlined by the United Nations, SDG 6 aims at ensuring access to water and sanitation for everyone. Access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene represents one of the most essential human needs for health and well-being. However, billions of people lack access to these basic services and, unless progress quadruples, will continue to lack it as of 2030.  On one side, rising population growth has led to a sharp increase in demand for water; on the other, the rise of global temperatures because of climate change has led to increased water scarcity, with half of the global population experiencing it approximately one time per month. Considering that water is a motor not only for health, but also for poverty reduction, food security, ecosystems and education, SDG 6 is vital for overall development, especially in regions where water scarcity poses an existential challenge. Jordan is considered one of the world’s driest countries and has long struggled with limited water resources. During the last two decades, the country has absorbed approximately 1 million refugees, mostly from Syria. As a direct consequence, the refugee crisis has restrained the already scarce resources. More recently, concerns have emerged over the potential displacement of people from Gaza, which would further challenge the country’s water security. The objective of this article is to explore the impact of refugees on Jordan’s water scarcity while analysing the broader implications for the host community. The article will attempt to make SGD 6 as tangible as possible. This will be done through the analysis of concrete challenges to water access and the proposal of pragmatic policy solutions. 

2. Background

Since 2015, Jordan has made significant steps toward achieving SDG 6, specifically by creating a precise and detailed plan on water management. The National Water Plan (2016-2025) was published by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation of Jordan as a long-term plan. The main goal of this plan was to create a resilient, sustainable, and efficient water sector to ensure the accomplishment of SDG 6. Considering Jordan’s chronic water scarcity, the strategy prioritized increasing water availability through desalination, reusage of wastewater, and rainwater harvesting. In order to secure new sources of water (for domestic, industrial, and agricultural use), major projects such as the Aqaba-Amman desalination and the expansion of wastewater treatment facilities were implemented. Also, the plan also focused on reducing Non-Revenue Water (NRW). In fact, worth noting is the fact that Jordan has an enormous issue given that approximately 50% of water is lost through leaks and illegal connections. As such, Jordan acted to prevent these losses by having a stronger framework on water theft legislation and by improving infrastructure. By doing so, Jordan aimed to reduce NRW losses by 25%. Furthermore, agriculture accounts for most of the country’s water use despite contributing only approximately 3% to GDP. Thus, the National Water Plan aimed at improving water efficiency in agriculture and industry. The strategy to reduce this waste included transitioning from fresh water to wastewater for farming and adopting modern irrigation techniques. Additionally, Jordan’s strategy integrated climate change adaptation by expanding non-conventional water sources and strengthening regional transboundary water negotiations to ensure the access to shared resources ranging from Jordan to Yarmouk Rivers. Lastly, the plan aimed at implementing governance reforms, stronger institutional coordination, and legal updates, all essential to support the previous efforts.

Since 2015, Jordan has been implementing the National Water Strategy and has achieved many goals despite the challenges. For instance, there have been many advancements in the desalination projects. In 2017, Jordan inaugurated its first seawater desalination plant in Aqaba, with a capacity of approximately 500 million cubic meters (MCM) per hour. This project was able to provide a reliable water source for domestic, industrial, and agricultural purposes for the region. Building on this success, Jordan also initiated the Aqaba-Amman Water Desalination and Conveyance Project. This was expected to supply almost 300 million cubic meters annually, addressing 25% of the nation’s water demand upon completion between 2026 and 2027. Concerning wastewater management, Jordan operates 33 wastewater treatment plants, treating 190 MCM in 2021. This treated water is essential: it provides a concrete alternative water source for irrigation in the agricultural sector, while it allows potable groundwater to be used exclusively for drinking purposes. Also, due to the investment targeting a 25% loss rate by 2040, the country also made significant progress in the reduction of Non-Revenue Water. Specifically, stronger enforcement measures have been implemented to prevent illegal water connections, such as the installation of leak detection systems.

However, Jordan has also faced major challenges in achieving its National Water Strategy goals. One of the hardest challenges concerns the ongoing refugee crisis, which has inevitably increased overall water demand. As mentioned previously, in the last decades, Jordan has absorbed approximately 1 million refugees. As a result, per capita water availability has dropped to less than 100 cubic meters per year, representing one of the globe’s lowest levels. It is also important to mention that the government’s initial goal of reducing NRW by 25% by 2022 has not been met, primarily due to aging infrastructure and illegal connections. In addition, because of regional conflicts, the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project in 2021 broke down, derailing a critical project that can provide more than 65 million cubic meters of water every year. Lastly, it is also important to account for climate change, as it continues to worsen water scarcity. Keeping all of these factors into consideration, alongside weak financial sustainability (as water tariffs remain highly subsidized leading to reliance on foreign aid), the gap between demand and supply for water continues to widen, especially in northern Jordan, where refugee populations are highest. Despite the efforts and progress, SDG 6 for 2030 remains a distant challenge that only strengthened regional cooperation, expansion of desalination efforts, and improved governance mechanisms might be able to achieve.

3. Analysis

Achieving SDG 6 for Jordan requires more than just national-level policies. In dry regions like the Middle East, where there is the presence of geopolitical tensions and cross-boundary water sources, it becomes complex to manage water. Because of this, global partnership becomes essential. As clarified before, Jordan has implemented various domestic policies in an attempt to improve its water supply. However, these domestic policies are going to be insufficient in meeting its rising demand for water, and thus, multilateral action is a critical strategic player to obtain long-term objectives. For example, the 2021 Water-Energy Agreement between Israel, Jordan, and UAE represents an important cross-border partnership that works on SDG 6 while also advancing SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy). This agreement, facilitated by the UAE, is based on an exchange model. On one side, Jordan will build a massive solar farm (600 MW capacity) to generate electricity for Israel; on the other, Israel will supply Jordan with 200 million cubic meters of desalinated water annually from the Mediterranean Sea. As mentioned previously, in Jordan per capita water availability has dropped below 100 cubic meters annually, making this deal crucial for the country. 

Despite its great potential however, the agreement has faced and is facing significant political and logistical challenges. Firstly, as the conflict in Gaza heightens tensions between Israel and Jordan, many Jordanians oppose cooperation with Israel, as they view it as a form of dependence on a country with which Jordan has historically had tense relations. This opposition has led to protests in Amman following the announcement of the deal. Secondly, the agreement was signed under Israel’s previous government. Nonetheless, political shifts have led to uncertainty on its implementation. Thirdly, the UAE was instrumental in orchestrating and financing the original agreement. Nevertheless, since the war in Gaza erupted in October 2023, relations between the UAE and Israel have been worsening, and it is now questioned whether Abu Dhabi would continue to sponsor the project. Together with this, regional investors may hesitate to fund infrastructure projects that require long-term political stability, which is currently undermined. For these reasons, it is possible that Jordan might struggle to find alternative fundings for the solar energy infrastructure, which represents a fundamental pillar of the agreement. Lastly, the war in Gaza has shifted Israel’s domestic priorities, with a focus on national security and military operations. Therefore, while the Israel-Jordan-UAE Water-Energy Deal was seen as a step toward regional integration, the war in Gaza has disrupted diplomatic progress and trust must be renewed between Israel and Arab states for the agreement to work. 

Nonetheless, the Israel-Jordan-UAE Water-Energy Deal offers a potential blueprint for other water-scarce regions that seek to integrate renewable energy with water security solutions. Indeed, this agreement shows that regional trade-offs can address mutual resources needs. For example, a similar strategy could be adopted between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Indeed, while Iraq suffers severe water shortages as a consequence of upstream damming by Turkey and Iran, it could trade energy for water. Likewise, in North Africa, given the access to the Mediterranean Sea and increasing climate-induced droughts, a cooperation between Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya could be constructed to develop joint desalination projects. Furthermore, the UAE’s role as a financial mediator shows how multilateral investment can catalyze large-scale projects. Thus, the model can be upscaled with funding from other states or international development banks (such as the World Bank) to serve dry nations of Sub Saharan Africa or Central Asia. Lastly, this project addresses both SDG 6 and 7 through fossil fuel reduction and ensuring climate-resilient solutions. The same is witnessed in Morocco, where large solar power plans (such as the Noor Ouarzazate solar power plant) have been utilized as a tool to power desalination plants and optimize efficiency for use in agriculture.

4. Policy Analysis and Recommendations

The Israel-Jordan-UAE deal represents an opportunity to provide Jordan with water in the future, while promoting renewable energy integration at the same time. Still, the political instability deriving from the conflict in Gaza, the uncertainties relative to funding, and public opposition in Jordan, make the project intangible. To solve this, three strategies should be adopted. First, it is essential to secure financial stability for the project. To mitigate the risk of the UAE pulling out of the agreement, Jordan should diversify its financial partnerships. It could seek funds from international financial institutions like the World Bank, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, or the European Investment Bank, which would provide a more stable (as they should not be politically involved) and long-term solution. Additionally, Jordan could attempt to attract private investment by offering tax incentives to companies that invest in its solar energy infrastructure. Second, public opposition in Jordan to cooperate with Israel could be tackled by some public awareness campaigns that clearly state the benefits of this project, specifically enhancing how it will ensure water security for Jordanians. Also, it would be essential to create a public oversight committee with Jordan, Israeli, and UAE representatives, to increase transparency and rebuild public trust ensuring Jordan’s national interests are protected. Finally, as a hedge against Israel policy fluctuations, Jordan needs to demand legally binding agreements guaranteeing annual deliveries of 200 million cubic meters of desalination water, irrespective of future government. The inclusion of penalty clauses would guarantee that in case Israel does not meet its obligations, Jordan will be economically compensated or given substitute water supplies. 

Jordan must also develop a comprehensive water plan that considers both its growing refugee population and the overall Middle East water crisis.  Indeed, Jordan has already seen its water system strained by the Syrian refugee influx, and concerns have increased regarding the potential additional refugees from Gaza. As the population of Jordan increases and climate change intensifies drought patterns, long-term water security will have to be tackled through targeted policies. A priority, for example, would be to strengthen water infrastructure in areas that host refugees, specifically in north Jordan, where the refugee density is at its highest. These areas often experience water shortages, which often also lead to tensions between refugees. While international aid has helped sustain basic water access, supply remains unreliable. In addressing this challenge, Jordan may decentralize its water system by commissioning small and localized desalination and wastewater facilities along refugee settlements and cities. In fact, this will relieve pressure on nation-scale pipelines and enable more uniform, localized supply of water. In addition, smart water metering and leak detection systems should be installed in receiving areas where refugees are welcomed to assist in preventing waste and improving supply efficiency. International bodies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Bank should be encouraged to invest in long-term water infrastructure rather than short-term temporary interventions. 

Additionally, aside from local-level development of infrastructure, Jordan must also enhance transboundary water arrangements to ensure safe water supply for refugees as well as host communities. Indeed, the Yarmouk River, which is the most vital water source of Jordan, has suffered reduced flow due to Syria’s upstream diversion of water, thus violating existing water-sharing agreements. Notably, since the 1987 agreement, Syria increased its number of dams from 26 to 48 and drilled approximately 3,500 wells in the river basin, actions that have significantly decreased the river’s flow into Jordan. Apart from this, as discussed previously, Israel’s implementation of the Energy Deal between Israel, Jordan, and UAE is politically risky due to the Gaza war and the unstable Israeli domestic policies. In order to reduce the risks, Jordan should negotiate new agreements with Syria and Israel and ensure historically agreed-upon water allocations. In the event, the United Nations or World Bank would make suitable neutral mediators to establish fair water-sharing bargains, halting exploitative upstream diversions. Besides, Jordan may expand trade agreements regarding water and energy with the Gulf states. For example, it could trade with Saudi Arabia, where the surplus of desalinated water is piped to Jordan’s north in exchange for renewable energy exports. 

Lastly, agriculture remains Jordan’s most water-intensive sector, but it only accounts for 3% of GDP. This contrast adds to water scarcity and takes away from domestic and refugee water needs. Moreover, as water demand keeps rising in Jordanian urban areas, policies must balance modernizing the use of water in agriculture with food security. Subsidizing efficient irrigation methods such as drip irrigation and hydroponic farming is one reform that might be instituted.. These methods could help reduce wastewater especially concerning the production of water-intensive crops like tomatoes and citrus fruits. Furthermore, scaling up vertical farming projects in refugee-hosting areas would not only reduce water consumption, but also create economic opportunities for refugees. The project would help to meet both SDG 6 and SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth). Private sector involvement should be promoted. This may entail such activities as providing incentives to businesses to invest in agriculture technology in the Jordan Valley.

5. Conclusion 

Jordan’s water deficit has been compounded by climate change, geopolitical tensions, and increasing refugee inflows, posing a risk to the achievement of SDG 6 by 2030. Domestic initiatives like the National Water Strategy (2016-2025) and international programs like the Israel-Jordan-UAE Water-Energy agreement have provided the basis to make progress. However, structural problems ranging from inadequate transboundary agreements to water inefficiency in agriculture pose a risk to long-term sustainability. To meet these challenges, there is a need to intervene with multi-layer policies that combine regional coordination, financial stability, and sustainable resource use. In particular, effective security of Jordanian water has to go beyond ambitious infrastructure projects and include localized solutions that serve refugee-hosting communities directly. These would include constructing small-scale water desalination and wastewater treatment facilities, increasing smart water metering, and embedding climate adaptation technology. All these would be necessary in a bid to guarantee water distribution that is fair across Jordan. Alternatively, strengthening transboundary water-sharing arrangements with Syria and Jordan, as well as exploring water-energy trade arrangements with Gulf states, would allow Jordan to acquire long-term water supply.

Despite the political and financial uncertainties framing the Israel-Jordan-UAE Water-Energy Deal, its underlying model – leveraging renewable energy to secure water access – offers a replicable framework for other water scarce regions. Through the utilization of diversified financial sponsors, diplomatic agreement application, and public engagement, Jordan can optimize the benefits of the agreement and lower risk. Similarly, optimizing water use in agriculture through the implementation of wastewater recycling, hydroponic farming, and private investment will further avoid wasted water while optimizing food security.

In conclusion, it is important to remember that Jordan’s water crisis is not a unique case. Instead, it mirrors broader global issues of managing economic development with climate change issues and human security. In simple words, decision-makers, international stakeholders, and local actors must act in a coordinated way in order to achieve SDG 6. Through an integrated and forward-looking water approach, Jordan can transform its vulnerabilities into an opportunity and become a sustainable example for other highly resource-vulnerable countries to follow. With proper management, intelligent investments, and forward-looking water-energy synergies, Jordan can come even closer to the 2030 goal of universal water access.

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