Weapons Trade and Peace: The Irony of SDG 16 in a World of Arms Deals

This article is part of our collaboration with International Policy Review at IE University. Photo Credits: Getty Images

Abstract

This paper analyses the contradiction between Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16), which promotes peace, justice, and strong institutions; and the practices of the world’s major arms-exporting nations, many of whom are also leading advocates of the SDGs. While regulatory frameworks like the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Wassenaar Arrangement aim to align arms transfers with the objectives of SDG 16, they are plagued by limitations such as non-binding obligations, selective enforcement, and lack of transparency. Through case studies of Yemen and Ukraine, the paper will further illustrate how arms exports have intensified conflict, undermined the rule of law, and weakened institutions, often in direct contradiction to SDG 16 targets. The paper argues that strategic and economic interests consistently override commitments to peace and governance, revealing the gap between stated ideals and actual conduct. To close this gap, the study proposes structural reforms to SDG 16, including enforceable legal obligations, improved monitoring mechanisms, and more context-specific approaches to peacebuilding. Without such measures, the realization of SDG 16 will remain aspirational and disconnected from geopolitical realities. 

Keywords: SDG 16, global arms trade, Arms Trade Treaty, Wassenaar Arrangement, Yemen conflict.

1. Introduction

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal SDG 16 aims to promote peace, justice, and strong institutions, calling for global reduction of violence, improved governance, and equitable access to justice. However, a stark contradiction emerges when considering the role of major arms-exporting nations in advancing these aims. The same countries that advocate the most for peace and stability, notably the United States, France, China, Russia, Germany and the United Kingdom, are also the world’s largest arms dealers. Many of the largest exporters, countries, have incorporated Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions, or similar provisions into their national policies and export control frameworks. Despite this aspiration, through extensive arms trading, these nations continue to fuel violent conflicts, directly undermining SDG 16.1’s goal of reducing violence and death rates. By fueling conflict and at times authoritarian regimes, the imported weapons ae used to suppress dissent and weaken judicial systems, threatening SDG 16.3’s commitment to promoting the rule of law and ensuring equal access to justice. 

This paradox, however, is particularly evident in the context of SDG 16.4, which calls for a substantial reduction in illicit financial and arms flows by 2030. The illicit arms trade, estimated to be worth billions of dollars annually, sustains organized crime networks, terrorist organizations, and insurgent groups across unstable regions, which today is particularly clear in Yemen, Ukraine, and the Middle East. Crucially, most arms circulating in illicit markets today originate from weapons that were initially transferred legally. According to a 2020 report by the Small Arms Survey, the diversion of legally transferred arms, through theft, loss, resale, or unauthorized retransfer, is the primary source of weapons fueling illicit markets worldwide. Arms intended for national militaries or police forces are often repurposed, either by corrupt officials selling them on the black market or by armed groups seizing stockpiles during conflicts. A striking example is Libya, where arms legally exported prior to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi by major powers including France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Russia, flooded regional black markets after state collapse. These resales and repurposing of weapons later fueled major insurgencies and terrorism across the Sahel.  

Beyond fueling violence and illicit arms flows, the global arms trade also undermines broader efforts to build accountable and transparent institutions, as called for in SDG 16.5, 16.6, and 16.a. Arms deals are often marked by high levels of corruption, secrecy, and political favoritism, which erode public trust and weaken the integrity of state institutions. Major arms contracts frequently involve opaque negotiations, hidden commissions, and bribery scandals, such as the notorious Al-Yamamah deal between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the prioritization of military sales over democratic oversight undermines efforts to establish transparent and effective governance, in direct contradiction to SDG 16.6. In fragile or post-conflict states, the influx of advanced weaponry without robust accountability mechanisms can overwhelm national institutions, further destabilizing security sectors and making it more difficult to combat organized crime and terrorism, thereby threatening SDG 16.a. It is easy to argue that in many cases, instead of strengthening governance structures and promoting peace, the global arms trade entrenches cycles of violence, corruption, and institutional weakness.  

This reality reveals a profound contradiction, that despite publicly advocating for SDG 16, the world’s leading nations, who are also the largest arms exporters, are themselves responsible for a significant portion of the failures to achieve this goal. Their continued prioritization of arms sales over genuine commitments to peace and governance has not only fueled violence and illicit arms flows, often used to commit human rights violations, but has also weakened efforts to build strong, transparent institutions. Nevertheless, these contradictory objectives have not gone unnoticed. In response, national and international regulatory frameworks have attempted to introduce greater transparency and accountability into the global arms trade in an effort to support the broader aims of SDG 16. Yet critical questions remain about the effectiveness of these measures. Given these concerns, this paper will explore the contradiction between the principles of SDG 16 and the realities of the global arms trade. In their efforts to fulfill the Sustainable Development Goals, countries often implement supporting frameworks through the ratification of international treaties or the adoption of national legislation aligned with the SDG agenda. Accordingly, this research will examine how such regulatory mechanisms, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty and the Wassenaar Arrangement are used to demonstrate compliance with SDG 16. The analysis will assess the effectiveness of these international agreements and propose policy recommendations to enhance transparency, curb illicit trade, and hold major arms-exporting states accountable. It will also include case studies of Yemen and Ukraine, examining how arms exports have escalated conflicts and undermined peace-building efforts. Ultimately, this research will argue that without modernization and changes are made, the full realization of SDG 16 will remain unattainable.

2. Regulatory Frameworks and their Limitations

2.1 The Arms Trade Theory

Recognizing the risks associated with unregulated arms transfers, several international frameworks have been established to promote transparency, accountability, and ethical standards in the global arms trade. Chief among these is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2013. The ATT is the first legally binding international agreement regulating the international transfer of conventional arms with the aim of reducing human suffering, promoting responsibility among exporting states, and preventing weapons from reaching conflict zones or human rights violators. In principle, the ATT aligns closely with several sub-targets of SDG 16. It supports SDG 16.1 (reducing violence and conflict-related deaths) by seeking to prevent arms from reaching parties that would use them to perpetuate violence. It addresses SDG 16.3 (promoting the rule of law and access to justice) by aiming to limit arms transfers that could undermine judicial and governance structures. It targets SDG 16.4 (reduction of illicit arms flows) through its emphasis on preventing diversion and unauthorized transfers. Finally, it promotes SDG 16.6 (development of accountable and transparent institutions), and SDG 16.8 (strengthening the participation of developing countries in global governance) by requiring reporting on arms transfers and encouraging international cooperation. However, it is important to note that while the ATT’s objectives broadly reflect the aims of SDG 16, the treaty itself does not explicitly mention the Sustainable Development Goals or frame its obligations in terms of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The alignment between the ATT and SDG 16 is therefore indirect and interpretative, rather than formalized within the treaty’s text. 

In order to achieve these objectives, the ATT requires signatories to assess the potential consequences of each arms export. States must consider whether the transfer could contribute to serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law, or whether it could undermine peace and security. In cases where there is an “overriding risk,” the export should be denied. One of the most significant flaws lies in its limited participation by major exporters. Leading arms producers such as the United States, Russia, China, and India have refused to ratify the treaty or, in the case of the U.S., officially withdrawn (in 2019 under President Trump). Without the involvement of these key actors, the treaty lacks the universality necessary to regulate the majority of global arms flows. Even among countries that have ratified the ATT, many, including prominent exporters like France and the United Kingdom, continue to authorize arms sales that appear to directly violate the treaty’s principles. For instance, the continuation of weapons supply to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite credible evidence of their use in unlawful airstrikes in Yemen, raises serious concerns about selective enforcement. 

The ATT also suffers from structural and operational weaknesses. Compliance is largely self-reported, and in 2024, only 44% of state parties submit the required annual reports. Many of those that do report provide incomplete or classified information, undermining the treaty’s aim of transparency. The language of the treaty itself is often vague, where terms like “overriding risk” are left undefined, allowing states to justify controversial transfers based on economic or political interests rather than humanitarian considerations. No independent enforcement mechanism exists to verify compliance or impose consequences for violations, leaving accountability to the discretion of national governments. These weaknesses are reflected in recent quantitative trends. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has demonstrated that the overall financial value of the arms trade continues to grow, reaching an estimated $95 billion annually by 2024. Simultaneously, the illicit share of the global arms market grew recently from an estimated 10–15% to 15–20%. These trends suggest that not only has the ATT failed to stem the flow of illicit weapons, but that the volume of overall arms trading has remained a thriving sector, even its watch, an outcome directly at odds with the objectives of SDG 16, especially 16.4.  In all, while the ATT provides a normative framework for responsible arms trading, as it stands, the treaty has failed to halt the continued militarization of conflict zones and the global circulation of weapons, contributing to the very conditions SDG 16 was created to address.

2.2. The Wassenaar Arrangement

Alongside the Arms Trade Treaty, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (established in 1996) represents another key international framework aimed at regulating the global arms trade. The Wassenaar Arrangement brings together 42 participating states, including all major Western arms exporters such as the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Its primary objective is to promote transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use technologies, particularly to prevent destabilizing accumulations of weapons and equipment that could threaten regional and international security. In contrast to the ATT, the Wassenaar Arrangement operates as a non-binding, voluntary agreement, what is commonly referred to as “soft law”. Participating states agree to establish national policies for export controls based on common guidelines and to exchange information about their arms transfers. However, the arrangement does not impose legally binding obligations on its members, nor does it establish enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance. Instead, it encourages states to implement national legislation and licensing procedures that reflect the agreed-upon best practices. 

 While the Wassenaar Arrangement has achieved broader participation from major arms exporters compared to the ATT, its voluntary nature significantly limits its practical impact. States retain full discretion over whether and how to apply the guidelines, leading to considerable variation in national export control regimes. There is no supranational body to monitor adherence, no penalties for failure to report, and no requirement to deny transfers that could contribute to human rights abuses or conflict escalation. Consequently, while the arrangement fosters some degree of transparency, such as through regular exchange of information on arms transfers, it does little to prevent controversial or destabilizing arms deals in practice. In short, while the Wassenaar Arrangement represents an important effort to coordinate export controls among major producers, its soft law framework, lack of enforceability, and gaps in coverage render it insufficient as a tool for ensuring that arms trading practices align with the commitments made under the Sustainable Development Goals. Like the ATT, it illustrates the gap between normative commitments to peace, justice, and strong institutions and the realities of global arms governance.

3. Case Studies: Impact of Arms Trade on Conflict and Governance

3.1 The Conflict in Yemen 

The civil war in Yemen, which erupted in 2014, has evolved into one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century. With an estimated 377,000 deaths and millions displaced, the conflict has exposed the profound ways in which global arms trading practices undermine the objectives of SDG 16, particularly the goals of reducing violence (16.1), promoting the rule of law (16.3), curbing illicit arms flows (16.4), building accountable institutions (16.6), and strengthening global governance (16.8). 

The conflict has been heavily fueled by foreign arms supplies. The Saudi-led coalition, primarily armed by the United States, United Kingdom, and France, has conducted thousands of airstrikes, many of which have targeted civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and residential areas. Investigations by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly documented the coalition’s use of Western-manufactured precision-guided munitions, such as the U.S.-made GBU-12 bombs, in attacks that violate international humanitarian law. Meanwhile, the Houthi rebels have received significant military support from Iran, including ballistic missiles, drones, and small arms, often smuggled through clandestine maritime networks bypassing global sanctions. These arms transfers have enabled the Houthis to launch cross-border attacks on Saudi and Emirati territory, intensifying regional instability. The role of arms exporters in perpetuating violence in Yemen highlights a fundamental failure to meet SDG 16.1, which calls for the reduction of all forms of violence and related death rates. Despite overwhelming evidence of human rights abuses, the United States and the United Kingdom authorized approximately $27 billion in arms sales to Saudi Arabia between 2015 and 2023, demonstrating the prioritization of strategic and economic interests over humanitarian concerns. These transfers directly contravene Article 7 of the ATT, which prohibits arms transfers where there is an overriding risk that the weapons will be used to commit serious violations of international law. Nevertheless, the absence of a binding enforcement mechanism within the ATT has allowed these violations to persist without consequence, exposing the treaty’s severe structural weaknesses. 

Similarly, the Wassenaar Arrangement, despite broader participation from major exporters, has proven ineffective in addressing the crisis. The transfer of conventional arms from Wassenaar participants to actors in the Yemeni conflict demonstrates how voluntary regimes fail to prevent destabilizing arms flows that erode governance and perpetuate human suffering, thereby undermining both SDG 16.4 (reducing illicit arms flows) and SDG 16.6 (building effective and transparent institutions). Beyond formal arms transfers, the Yemeni conflict is sustained by illicit financial and arms flows, which play a crucial role in undermining the rule of law and sustaining war economies. Smuggling networks operating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden facilitate the trafficking of weapons to rebel groups, circumventing official embargoes. Illicit financial activities, including black-market arms sales and corrupt procurement practices, continue to finance militias, warlords, and insurgent forces. These dynamics weaken legitimate institutions, foster organized crime, and make conflict resolution increasingly elusive, in direct violation of the goals of SDG 16.3 (promoting rule of law and access to justice) and 16.a (strengthening national institutions to prevent violence and crime). 

Western states, notably the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, continued to supply billions of dollars in arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates even after extensive documentation of civilian casualties, war crimes, and violations of international humanitarian law. This sustained support was not merely incidental, it was deeply rooted in broader geopolitical interests. For instance, the United States’ and United Kingdom’s military support for Saudi Arabia has been closely tied to securing access to Gulf oil resources, preserving lucrative arms markets, and counterbalancing Iranian influence in the region. France’s arms deals similarly reflected its desire to maintain strong economic and diplomatic ties with Gulf monarchies, exemplified by multi-billion-dollar contracts for fighter jets and military equipment. These examples demonstrate that strategic alliances and economic interests consistently outweighed the international legal and ethical obligations imposed by treaties such as the ATT and Wassenaar Arrangement. The gap between stated commitments to peace, justice, and strong institutions under SDG 16 and the actual conduct of major exporters reveals the underlying fragility of current arms trade governance structures; it indicates that they are easily subordinated when strategic or economic advantages are at stake. 

3.2 The Conflict in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine, particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, has rapidly transformed into one of the largest arenas of international arms transfers in modern history. While international military support has been crucial to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression, the massive influx of weaponry poses significant risks to the broader objectives of SDG 16, particularly targets 16.1 (reducing violence), 16.3 (promoting the rule of law), 16.4 (reducing illicit arms flows), 16.6 (building accountable institutions), and 16.a (strengthening national institutions to prevent violence and organized crime).

Between 2022 and 2024, Ukraine received an estimated $50 billion in U.S. weapons alone, with thirty-five countries providing a wide array of military equipment, including tanks, HIMARS rocket systems, and Patriot air defense batteries. As a result, Ukraine has become the world’s largest arms importer, accounting for 9% of total global arms imports within a single conflict zone. The proliferation risk associated with the Ukraine war directly threatens the aims of SDG 16.4, which calls for a substantial reduction in illicit arms flows. In addition, historical precedents, such as post-conflict Afghanistan and Libya, demonstrate that large-scale arms transfers often result in weapons leaking into illicit markets, where they are later used by extremist groups and organized crime syndicates. Similar patterns are beginning to emerge in Ukraine, where reports have already indicated that the U.S.-supplied weapons, including Javelin missiles and Stinger systems, are being diverted onto black markets within Ukraine and neighboring countries, while smuggled North Korean artillery has been used by Russian-backed separatists in Donbas.

These concerns highlight the limits of existing global governance frameworks, including the ATT and the Wassenaar Arrangement, in controlling arms proliferation during high-intensity conflicts. While the ATT mandates export risk assessments, its application has proven largely symbolic in the context of the Ukraine war. Although some Western states have conducted nominal evaluations before authorizing arms shipments, the overwhelming strategic and geopolitical imperative of supporting Ukraine has led to a widespread relaxation of export controls and minimal scrutiny regarding potential post-conflict risks. This pattern continues to support the broader structural flaw that when immediate national interests or geopolitical calculations are at stake, the commitment to Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 16, is quickly subordinated. Arms-exporting states that publicly champion peace, justice, and strong institutions routinely abandon these principles in moments of crisis, prioritizing military solutions over long-term peace-building strategies. 

More fundamentally, the Ukraine conflict exposes the international community’s entrenched reliance on militarized responses to emerging security threats. Rather than pursuing diplomatic mediation, conflict prevention, or peacebuilding initiatives, the dominant reaction among many powerful states remains the rapid transfer of arms. This approach runs directly counter to the spirit of SDG 16, which envisions the resolution of conflicts through non-violent means, the strengthening of institutions, and the promotion of justice and rule of law. The default turn to weapons trading as a primary instrument of foreign policy, even under the justification of self-defense or collective security, perpetuates cycles of violence and undermines global efforts to create sustainable, peaceful societies.

4. Policy Recommendations

The analysis of the global arms trade demonstrates that Sustainable Development Goal 16 is fundamentally disconnected from the realities of international relations and conflict dynamics. While SDG 16 aspires to promote peace, justice, and strong institutions, it rests on the unrealistic assumption that states will prioritize these values over immediate geopolitical, strategic, and economic interests. In practice, this is rarely the case. The failures of regulatory frameworks such as the ATT and the Wassenaar Arrangement clearly illustrate the gap that despite formal commitments to responsible arms transfers, major exporters continue to supply weapons to conflict zones and authoritarian regimes when it serves their national interests. The behavior of states in the Yemen and Ukraine conflicts further reinforces this point. Rather than upholding SDG 16’s ideals, states have prioritized strategic alliances, economic benefits, and regional power balances.

To make SDG 16 more relevant and effective in the current international context, it must undergo a fundamental restructuring to reflect the practical challenges observed in recent conflicts. First, the language of SDG 16 must move away from broad, aspirational formulations toward clear, operational standards. Vague calls to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies” are insufficient when applied to complex conflicts where strategic interests dominate. Instead, SDG 16 should articulate specific, measurable obligations regarding arms transfers, conflict prevention, and institutional support. For example, explicit thresholds for when arms transfers must be suspended, such as credible evidence of systemic human rights violations, would create enforceable standards rather than leaving compliance to political discretion.

In addition, the SDG 16 framework should call for binding obligations, recognizing that voluntary compliance has repeatedly failed. As shown by the ineffectiveness of the ATT and Wassenaar Arrangement, states will not regulate their arms exports consistently unless legally compelled to do so. SDG 16 should instead push for compulsory reporting, independent monitoring, and automatic sanctions for non-compliance, promoting countries to comply with international regulations, which would shift responsibility from goodwill to enforceable duty. Without legal pressure, states will continue to prioritize geopolitical and economic interests over the principles of peace and good governance. 

Finally, the framework of SDG 16 must become dynamic, adapting its targets based on empirical lessons from contemporary conflicts like Yemen and Ukraine. The assumption that a universal model of peacebuilding, centered on institutional strengthening alone, can succeed across all contexts ignores the realities of power struggles, external interventions, and arms proliferation. SDG 16 must incorporate more context-specific approaches, recognizing that the pathways to peace vary dramatically depending on the nature of the conflict, the actors involved, and the geopolitical environment. Lessons from recent conflicts should inform revised benchmarks for success, including standards for arms control, transitional justice, and security sector reform. Only by building direct accountability into legal and policy structures can SDG 16 shift from rhetorical aspiration to a tangible force shaping state behavior, even under the pressures of emerging crises. 

5. Conclusion

The contradiction at the heart of the global arms trade and the Sustainable Development Goal 16 is unmistakable. This essay has shown that while major arms-exporting nations publicly champion SDG 16’s vision of peace, justice, and strong institutions, their continuous prioritization of strategic alliances, economic interests, and regional power struggles through arms sales fundamentally undermines these ideals. The failures of regulatory frameworks like the Arms Trade Treaty and the Wassenaar Arrangement, combined with the realities observed in conflicts such as Yemen and Ukraine, expose how superficial the commitment to SDG 16 often is when faced with geopolitical realities. The irony is stark: those who most vocally promote peace are among the greatest contributors to the conditions that make peace unattainable. If SDG 16 is to have any meaningful impact, it must be restructured to impose clear, enforceable standards on arms exports and embed real accountability into international law and national policy. Otherwise, the SDGs risk remaining aspirational slogans disconnected from the dynamics of global conflict, and the world will continue to see arms deals eclipse the pursuit of peace.

6. Bibliography

International Development Law Organization (IDLO). Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. https://www.idlo.int/sustainable-development-goals/goal-16-peace-justice-and-strong-institutions. 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2023. Stockholm: SIPRI, March 2024. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Preventing Illicit Arms Flows: Brown Bag Lunch Presentation by Angela Me, CCPCJ 28th Session. Vienna: UNODC, May 2021. https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ_Sessions/CCPCJ_28/Brown-bag-lunches/Brown_bag_lunch_Angela_Me4.pdf.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC Annual Report 2023. Vienna: UNODC, 2024. https://www.unodc.org/documents/AnnualReport/UNODC_REPORT_2023-WEB.pdf. 

Small Arms Survey. Trade Update 2020: Eye on Ammunition Transfers to Africa. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2020. https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/trade-update-2020-eye-ammunition-transfers-africa. 

African Union Commission and Small Arms Survey. Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa. Addis Ababa: African Union, 2019. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/en-sas-au-mapping-report-text.pdf. 

Stimson Center. Libya’s Missing Weapons: The Case for Better Monitoring. Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2012. https://www.stimson.org/2012/libyas-missing-weapons/. 

Voice of America (VOA). “Jihadists, Insurgents Plundering State Arsenals Across Sahel.” Voice of America, November 21, 2016. https://www.voanews.com/a/jihadists-insurgents-plundering-state-arsenals-across-sahel/3604404.html. 

Control Arms. Practical Measures to Link the Arms Trade Treaty and the Sustainable Development Goals. New York: Control Arms, 2018. https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CA-Practical-measures-SDGs-Final.pdf. 

Global Financial Integrity (GFI). Corruption in the Global Arms Trade: An Overview. Washington, DC: GFI, 2010. https://gfintegrity.org/corruption-in-the-global-arms-trade-an-overview/. 

Corruption Tracker. “Al-Yamamah Arms Deals.” Corruption Tracker. https://corruption-tracker.org/case/al-yamamah-arms-deals. 

Mark Bromley and Paul Holtom. Arms Transfers to Fragile States: Preventing Diversion and Abuse. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2013/1. 

Stockholm: SIPRI, 2013. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1301.pdf.

Cooper, Katrina. “Sustainable Development Goal 16 and the Arms Trade Treaty: The ATT is Ready to Do the Work.” The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), May 29, 2018. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sustainable-development-goal-16-and-the-arms-trade-treaty-the-att-is-ready-to-do-the-work/

United Nations, The Arms Trade Treaty (New York: United Nations, 2014), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253.

Arms Control Association. “The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance.” Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-trade-treaty-glance.

ENACT Africa. “Curbing Illicit Arms is Key to Achieving the SDGs.” ENACT Observer, September 24, 2020. https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/curbing-illicit-arms-is-key-to-achieving-the-sdgs.

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). “The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).” https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/att/.

United Nations. “The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).” Audiovisual Library of International Law. https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/att/att.html.

Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat. Status of Participation in the ATT: CSP11 Working Group on Treaty Universalization. Geneva: ATT Secretariat, February 2025. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_WG%20meetings_Day%203_WGTU_ATT%20Secretariat_Status%20of%20Participation/ATT_CSP11_WG%20meetings_Day%203_WGTU_ATT%20Secretariat_Status%20of%20Participation.pdf.

Amnesty International. “Yemen: Embargo Arms to Saudi Arabia.” ReliefWeb, February 22, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-embargo-arms-saudi-arabia.

Control Arms Secretariat. Arms Trade Treaty Monitor: Summary 2024. New York: Control Arms, 2024. https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/EN-ATT_Summary_2024.pdf.

Maat Foundation for Peace, Development and Human Rights. Challenges Facing the Arms Trade Treaty: Proposal for a CSP10 Side Event. Geneva: Maat Foundation, 2024. https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10_Side_Events_Proposal_Maat_Challenges_Flyer/ATT_CSP10_Side_Events_Proposal_Maat_Challenges_Flyer.pdf.

Control Arms. “Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Arms Trade Treaty.” Control Arms Blog, December 24, 2023. https://controlarms.org/blog/10thattanniversary/.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024. Stockholm: SIPRI, March 2025. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.

Wassenaar Arrangement. “The Wassenaar Arrangement.” https://www.wassenaar.org/the-wassenaar-arrangement/.

Wassenaar Arrangement. “About Us.” https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/.

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). “Wassenaar Arrangement.” Nuclear Threat Initiative Education Center. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/wassenaar-arrangement/.

Arms Control Association. “The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance.” Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar.

Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT). “The War on Yemen’s Civilians.” Campaign Against Arms Trade. https://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/the-war-on-yemens-civilians/.

Action on Armed Violence. “Briefing Note: Explosive Weapons Use in Yemen, 2014–2023.” ReliefWeb, November 28, 2023. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/briefing-note-explosive-weapons-use-yemen-2014-2023.

Amnesty International. “Yemen: US-Made Weapon Used in Air Strike That Killed Scores Amid Escalation by Saudi-Led Coalition.” ReliefWeb, November 14, 2023. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-us-made-weapon-used-air-strike-killed-scores-escalation-saudi-led-coalition.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). “Populations at Risk: Yemen.”. https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/yemen/.

Matthew Page. “Yemen: Money Over Morality.” The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), August 18, 2022. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/yemen-money-over-morality/.

Austin Lewis. “The Effectiveness of the Wassenaar Arrangement as the Non-Proliferation Regime for Conventional Weapons.” Honors Thesis, Stanford University, 2022. https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:mz349xm4602/The%20Effectiveness%20of%20the%20Wassenaar%20Arrangement%20as%20the%20Non-proliferation%20Regime%20for%20Conventional%20Weapons%20-%20Austin%20Lewis.pdf.

Michael Horton. “Arms from Yemen Will Fuel Conflict in the Horn of Africa.” Jamestown Foundation, October 30, 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/arms-from-yemen-will-fuel-conflict-in-the-horn-of-africa/.

The East African. “Illicit Weapons from Yemen Fueling Crime in Parts of Africa.” The East African, April 3, 2022. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/illicit-weapons-from-yemen-fueling-crime-in-parts-of-africa-3756142.

Bruce Riedel. “It’s Time to Stop U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia.” Brookings Institution, October 12, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/its-time-to-stop-us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/.

Alain Gresh. “France and the Gulf Monarchies: A New Best Friend.” Middle East Eye, November 22, 2021. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/france-gulf-monarchies-new-best-friend.

Euromaidan Press. “Ukraine Is World’s Top Arms Importer, U.S. Supplied Half, SIPRI Reports.” Euromaidan Press, March 10, 2025. https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/03/10/ukraine-is-worlds-top-arms-importer-us-supplied-half-sipri-reports/.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “Ukraine Becomes World’s Largest Arms Importer as U.S. Global Dominance in Arms Exports Grows.” Press release, March 11, 2025. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/ukraine-worlds-biggest-arms-importer-united-states-dominance-global-arms-exports-grows-russian.

The Insider. “War for Profit: How Corruption Is Destroying Russia’s Military Efforts.” The Insider, April 16, 2025. https://theins.ru/en/politics/279881.

Xarxanet. “War Drives Ukraine to Become World’s Leading Arms Importer.” Xarxanet Nonprofit News, March 2025. https://nonprofit.xarxanet.org/news/war-drives-ukraine-become-worlds-leading-arms-importer#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20country%20accounts%20for,have%20sent%20weapons%20to%20Ukraine.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The Illicit Market in Firearms: Module 4, Education for Justice (E4J) University Module Series. Vienna: UNODC, 2019. https://www.unodc.org/documents/e4j/Module_04_-_The_Illicit_Market_in_Firearms_FINAL.pdf.

Financial Express. “U.S. Failure to Control Weapons Supplied to Ukraine Increases International Tension.” Financial Express, January 30, 2025. https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/us-failure-to-control-weapons-supplied-to-ukraine-increases-international-tension/3667424/.

NK News. “Ukraine Says It Destroyed North Korean Weapons in Attack on Russian Arms Depot.” NK News, October 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/10/ukraine-says-it-destroyed-north-korean-weapons-in-attack-on-russian-arms-depot/.

Other posts that may interest you: